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Abstract
We build a dynamic model with currency, demand deposits and bank reserves. The monetary
base is controlled by the central bank, while the money supply is determined by the interactions
between the central bank, banks and public. In banking crises when banks cut loans, a Taylor
rule is not efficient. Negative interest on reserves or forward guidance is effective, but deflation
is still likely to be persistent. If the central bank simultaneously targets both the interest rate
and the money supply by a Taylor rule and a Friedman’s k-percent rule, inflation and output are
stabilized.
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1 Introduction
In the Great Recession, the federal funds rate was near zero; however, the deflation pressure
was still high as banks cut loans. That phenomenon raised many concerns among academics
and policy makers on how the central bank’s policy should be designed when the interest rate
channel was weak. Possible solutions for pushing up inflation in this circumstance are forward
guidance, helicopter money and quantitative easing (Bernanke, 2016c,b). The last two tools
can change the money supply directly (rather than indirectly through a money creation process
by banks); however they need to be integrated with standard monetary policy frameworks and
cannot be a daily tool like an interest rate targeting policy. This paper argues that the central
bank can utilize both instruments, interest rate and money supply, to do a better job at hitting
the inflation target in a banking crisis.
The common traditional consensus among economists is that the central bank cannot target
both interest rate and money supply at the same time. The central bank chooses either the
monetary base as its main instrument (Meltzer, 1987; McCallum, 1988; Friedman, 1960) or the
common interbank rate (Taylor, 1993). However, the introduction of a new monetary policy tool
- interest on reserves (IOR) - and the transformation of the economy from making transactions
with currency to with demand deposits will allow the central bank to use both above instruments.
With IOR, the price of reserves might disconnect from the quantity of reserves in the banking
system. With demand deposits, money can earn a positive nominal interest rate. Therefore, it
is a possible scenario that that the central bank can increase the money supply and raise IOR at
the same time.
This paper builds a dynamic model with bank reserves, currency, and demand deposits.
The monetary base in our model is controlled by the central bank, while the money supply is
determined by the interactions between the central bank, banks and the public. The interbank
rate is controlled either by open market operations or by adjusting IOR, so a wide range of
conventional and unconventional monetary policy can be assessed in this model.
We find that in normal times, an interest rate policy following a Taylor rule is a transparent
and effective means of controlling the economy. When the central bank cuts rates, the amount
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of the money supply increases because banks create more loans. As the price is sticky in our
model, the economy is stimulated due to the rise in the aggregate demand. The effect is identical
to the standard New Keynesian model.
However, in banking crises, when banks cannot make loans due to the capital constraints, a
policy following a Taylor rule is insufficient for pushing the real interest rate down. Even with
the negative IOR or forward guidance, the outcome is only slightly better. The main reason
is that the inflationary expectations also depend on the path of the money supply. In the case
of banking crisis, the endogenous money supply declines. If the central bank does not inject
liquidity directly into the market, the deflation pressure will be huge. Because of deflation and
the wedge created by the capital constraint, the real prime rate will be high even though the
interbank rate touches the zero lower bound.
Targeting both the money supply and the interest rate is very efficient in this situation. We
find that the central bank only needs to follow a simple Taylor rule and a Friedman’s k-percent
rule so that both output and inflation will be stabilized. After the crisis time, the central bank
can always come back to a simple Taylor rule.
Related Literature
Our model shares many similarities with the standard New Keynesian framework with the exis-
tence of the banking sector1. Banks play a role of intermediaries channeling funds from savers
to borrower in these models; while ours focuses on the function of creating money in the bank-
ing sector (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014). Banking crises create liquidity problem for
agents in the private sector as the money supply declines. In this sense, our model is identical
to Benigno and Nisticò (2017), where a shock worsening the liquidity of pseudo-safe assets can
create a crisis with a persistent deflation.
The money supply in our model is endogenous. The interest rate channel and the credit
channel are interdependent. In this aspect, our model is related to Bianchi and Bigio (2014)
and Afonso and Lagos (2015), where these authors apply the search and matching theory to
1See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), Curdia and Woodford (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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study the banking sector. On the other hand, our banking sector is perfectly competitive and
frictionless, so we can focus more on the impact of monetary policy on output and inflation. On
the money demand side, we follow the cash-in-advance literature in (Lucas and Stokey, 1987;
Belongia and Ireland, 2006, 2014), so households hold currency and bank deposits as they pro-
vide the liquidity. Cash goods and deposit goods are bundled together in a constant elasticity of
substitution utility function.
To target both the money supply and interest rate, the central bank has to use IOR. This
tool is already mentioned in the literature (Sargent and Wallace, 1985; Goodfriend et al., 2002;
Kashyap and Stein, 2012; Ireland, 2014; Cochrane, 2014; Keister, 2016). Our model, different
from this line of research, can connect IOR with banking reserves, money supply and the inter-
bank rate in a micro-founded dynamic setup.
We also discuss two unconventional monetary policies: negative IOR and forward guidance.
Analysis of monetary policy with a negative interest rate can be found in Rognlie (2015). Our
model emphasizes the transmission through a negative IOR to the interbank rate and the deposit
rate while the framework in Rognlie (2015) assumes directly that the central bank can impose a
negative short term rate. In both papers, the negative rate might be an important tool when the
interbank rate is near zero. We also examine the effect of the central bank’s forward guidance
policy2 in a banking crisis context.
This paper extends the model in Ngotran (2017) to a more general environment, including
both currency and electronic money. Banking crises are the main themes in both paper and the
effectiveness of different hypothetical polices are assessed under this context. However, Ngo-
tran (2017) studies the inflation dynamics after the Great Recession and the appropriate policy
to get out of the low interest rate environment. This paper focuses on a new type of monetary
policy when the central bank targets both the money supply and the interest rate by two common
simple monetary rules.
The rest of the paper is divided into six parts. Section 2 and 3 describe the model. Section 4
and 5 study the equilibrium conditions as well as some theoretical results of this model. Section
2See (Eggertsson et al., 2003; Levin et al., 2009; Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2012; Campbell et al.,
2012; Keen, Richter and Throckmorton, 2017a)
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6 performs some experiments to assess the efficacy of different policies when banking crises
happen. Section 7 gives the conclusion.
2 The Environment
2.1 Notation:
Let Pt be the price of the final good. We use lowercase letters to represent the real balance of
a variable or its relative price. For example, the real reserves balance nt = Nt/Pt , or the real
price of intermediate goods pmt = P
m
t /Pt . The timing notation follows this rule: if a variable
is determined or chosen at time t, it will have the subscript t. The gross inflation rate is pit =
Pt/Pt−1.
2.2 Goods and Production Technology
We follow closely the model description in Ngotran (2017). Our model extends Ngotran (2017)
to the environment where currency and demand deposits coexist. There are four types of goods
in the economy: cash-goods y1,t produced by c-retailers who only accept currency as the mean of
payment, deposit-goods y2,t produced by d-retailers who only accept payment through banks,
wholesale goods yt( j) produced by wholesale firm j and intermediate good ymt produced by
households.
Each period households self-employ their labor lt to produce the homogeneous intermediate
good ymt under the production function:
ymt = lt
Households sell ymt to wholesale firms in the competitive market with the price P
m
t .
There is a continuum of wholesale firms indexed by j∈ [0,1]. Each wholesale firm purchases
the homogeneous intermediate good ymt from households and differentiates it into a distinctive
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wholesale goods yt( j) under the following technology:
yt( j) = ymt
Wholesale firms faces the Rotemberg adjustment cost when they change their prices.
Two types of retail firms both produce the final good yi,t (i = 1,2) by aggregating a variety
of differentiated wholesale goods yt( j):
yi,t =
(∫ 1
0
yt( j)
ε−1
ε d j
) ε
ε−1
, i = 1,2
As the markets for cash-goods and deposit-goods are perfectly competitive and they have the
same constant return to scale production function, they have the same price Pt .
2.3 Time, Demographics and Preferences
Time is discrete, indexed by t and continues forever. The model is in the deterministic setting
and has six types of agents: bankers, households, wholesale firms, two types of retail firms, and
the consolidated government.
There is a measure one of identical infinitely lived bankers in the economy. Bankers discount
the future with the discount factor β . Each period, they gain utility from consuming a basket ct
that contains cash-goods c1,t and deposit-goods c2,t . Their utility at the period t can be written
as:
∞
∑
s=0
β s log(ct+s), with ct =
[
2
∑
i=1
α
1
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
i,t
] σ
σ−1
where αi is the share of cash-goods or deposit-goods in the basket and σ is the elasticity of
substitution between two goods in the basket.
There is also a measure one of identical infinitely lived households. Households discount
the future with the discount factor β˜<β , so they will borrow from bankers in the steady state.
Similar to bankers, each period households gain utility from consuming the basket c˜t and lose
utility when providing labor lt to their own production. Household’s utility at the period t can
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Banker Banker
Loans: +St Deposits: + qltSt Loans: -δbBht−1 Deposits: -δbB
h
t−1
Net worth: + (1−qlt)St
Table 1: Banker issues loans (left) and collects on loans (right)
be written as:
∞
∑
s=0
β˜ s
[
log(c˜t+s)−χlt+s
]
, with c˜t =
[
2
∑
i=1
α
1
σ
i c˜
σ−1
σ
i,t
] σ
σ−1
where χ is the weight of labor in the utility function.
Wholesale firms, retail firms are infinitely lived, owned by households.
The consolidated government includes both the government and the central bank, so for
convenience, we assume there is no independence between the government and the central bank.
2.4 Assets
There are two types of financial assets: bank loans to households Bht and interbank loans B
f
t .
(a) Bank loans to households (Bht ) : We follow Leland and Toft (1996) and Bianchi and Bigio
(2014) to model the loan structure between bankers and households. The market for bank
loan is perfectly competitive and the price of loan is qlt . When a household wants to borrow
1 dollar at time t, bankers will create an account for her and deposit qlt dollars to her account.
In the exchange for that, this household promises to pay δb, δb(1− δb), ..., δb(1− δb)n−1,
δb(1− δb)n... dollars at time t + 1, t + 2,... t + n, t + n+ 1... where n runs to infinity and
0 < δb ≤ 1 (Table 1). Loans are illiquid and bankers cannot sell loans.
Let Bht be the nominal balance of loan stock in the period t, let St be the nominal flow of
new loan issuance, we have:
Bht = (1−δb)Bht−1+St
(b) Interbank loan (B ft ): Bankers can borrow reserves from other bankers in the interbank
market. The nominal gross interest rate in the interbank market is the interbank rate R ft .
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2.5 Money and Payment System
There are three types of money in our economy: currency xt , zero-maturity deposits mt and
reserves nt .
(a) Currency (xt): is issued by the central bank and held by households. If currency is held by
bankers, it is automatically converted to reserve. Currency is used for transactions between
households/bankers and c-retailers who sell cash-goods. Currency does not pay nominal
interest. The amount of currency in circulation is endogenous in the equilibrium.
(b) Zero maturity deposit (ZMD) (mt): is a type of e-money issued by bankers. ZMDs have
the same unit of account as currency. When holding these deposits, households earn the
gross nominal interest rate Rmt which is determined by the perfectly competitive banking
market. ZMDs are used for settling all transactions in the private sector, except for trans-
actions between households/bankers and c-retailers. When the market between bankers and
households open, household can convert ZMDs to currency or currency to ZMDs. They are
insured by the central bank, so they are totally safe.
(c) Reserve (nt): is a type of e-money issued by the central bank for only bankers. It has the
same unit of account with currency. The central bank pays the gross interest rate Rnt for
these reserves. Interest on reserves Rnt is a monetary policy tool of the central bank. At any
moment, bankers can convert these reserves to currency and pay households. Reserves are
used for settling transactions between bankers and bankers, bankers and the consolidated
government.
Transactions with currency are simple. However, transactions with zero maturity deposits relates
to many parties. We repeat the example in Ngotran (2017) to illustrate the connection between
the flows of ZMDs and reserves. If wholesale firm A (whose account at bank A) pays 1 dollars
to household B (whose account at bank B), the flows of payment will follow Table 2.
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Wholesale firm A Household B
Deposit: -1 Payable:-1 Deposit: +1
Receivable:-1
Bank A Bank B
Reserve: -1 Deposit: -1 Reserve: +1 Deposit: +1
The Central Bank
Reserve (bank A): -1
Reserve (bank B):+1
Table 2: Electronic Payment System
2.6 Central Bank and Monetary Policy
The central bank always uses the electronic payment system to conduct monetary policy. Each
period, the central bank transfers τt dollars in checks to households3. For any transactions
between the central bank and households, as the payments are conducted through the banking
system, we should think that they contain two sub-transactions: one between the central bank-
bankers is settled by reserves, one between bankers-households is settled by ZMDs.
The Central Bank Banks Public
Reserves:+τt Reserves:+τt Deposits: +τt Deposits:+τt Net worth: +τt
Net worth:-τt
Table 3: Helicopter Money / Lump-sum tax
2.7 Timing within one period
(i) Production takes place. Households sell goods to wholesalers, who, in turn, sell goods to
retailers. All of the payments between households-wholesalers, wholesalers-retailer are
delayed until the step (v).
3This can be seen as a shortcut of an open market operation process when the central bank purchases government
bonds from the government. Then the government transfers the payoffs to households. When τt is negative, it is
equivalent to a lump-sum tax
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(ii) The cash-good market opens. Households need cash-in-advance to purchase from c-
retailers. Bankers can convert reserves to cash to purchase from c-retailers.
(iii) The loan market between households and bankers opens. All the debt payments and loan
issuance will be conducted electronically. The government transfers money to households.
Households cannot exchange cash and deposits in this step.
(iv) The deposit-good market opens. Households need ZMD-in-advance to purchase goods
from d-retailers. Bankers can create ZMDs to purchase d-goods.
(v) Payments in the non-bank private sector are settled. Profits from firms are transfered
back to households under either form of cash or ZMDs. Households can go to banks
and readjust their portfolio between cash and deposits.
(vi) The banking market opens. Bankers can adjust the level of reserves by borrowing in the
interbank market, receiving new deposits.
3 Agents’ Problems
3.1 Bankers
There is a measure one of identical bankers in the economy. These bankers have to follow the
central bank’s regulations. There are three types of assets on a banker’s balance sheet: reserves
(nt), loans to households (bht ), loans to other bankers (b
f
t ). His liability side contains the zero-
maturity deposits that households deposit here (mt).
Banker
Reserves: nt Zero Maturity Deposits: mt
Loans to households: bht Net worth
Loans to other bankers: b ft
Cost: The banker faces a cost of managing loan, which is θbht in terms of deposit-goods.
The banker can adjust the level of his deposits and reserves after households and firms pay
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each other or when households withdraw currency from bank account. When these happen, the
banker can witness that the deposits and reserves outflow from or inflow to his bank. Let et be
the net inflow of deposits and reserves go into his bank, he will treat et as exogenous. When the
banking market opens, as the deposit market is perfectly competitive, he can choose any amount
dt of deposit inflows or outflows to his bank.
In each period, the banker treats all the prices as exogenous and chooses {ct ,c1,t ,c2,t ,nt ,
bht ,st ,mt ,b
f
t ,dt} to maximize his utility over a stream of consumption:
max
∞
∑
t=0
β t log(ct)
subject to
Rnt−1nt−1
pit
+
R ft−1b
f
t−1
pit
+dt + et + τt = nt +b ft + c1,t (Reserve Flows) (1)
mt =
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qLt st +θb
h
t −δb
bht−1
pit
+ c2,t +dt + et + τt (Deposit Flows) (2)
bht = (1−δb)
bht−1
pit
+ st (Loan Flows) (3)
ct =
[
2
∑
i=1
α
1
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
i,t
] σ
σ−1
(Consumption) (4)
nt ≥ ϕmt (Reserves Requirement) (5)
nt +b
f
t +b
h
t −mt ≥ κtbht (Capital Requirement) (6)
The equation (1) shows the change in reserves in the banker’s balance sheet. After receiving
the IOR, the previous balance of reserves becomes Rnt−1nt−1/pit . He also collects the payment
from the interbank loans he lends out to other bankers in the previous period R ft−1b
f
t−1/pit . He
can also increase his reserves by taking more deposits dt . When doing that, his reserves and his
liability increase by the same amount dt (Table 4). That is the reason we see dt appear on both
the equation (1) and (2). The similar effect can be found on τt- helicopter money and et . The
banker treats τt and et exogenously. Then, he can leave reserves nt at the central bank’s account
to earn interest rate, or lend reserves to another bankers b ft . To purchase the cash-goods c1,t
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Banker Banker
Reserves: +dt Deposits: +dt Reserves: - b
f
t
Interbank loan: + b ft
Table 4: The banker takes more deposits (left) and makes interbank loan (right)
Central Bank Banker c-Retailers
Reserves: -c1,t Reserves: -c1,t Net worth: -c1,t Currency: +c1,t
Currency: +c1,t (Vault Cash) Inventory: -c1,t
Table 5: Banker buys goods from c-retailers
Banker d-Retailers
Deposits: +(c2,t +θbht ) Deposits: +(c2,t +θbht )
Net worth: -(c2,t +θbht ) Inventory: -(c2,t +θbht )
Table 6: Banker buys goods from d-retailers
from c-retailers, he converts reserves into currency (Table 5)4.
The equation (2) shows the change in the banker’s deposits. He makes loans to households
by issuing deposits or creating ZMDs (Table 1)5. The banker also issues his own ZMDs to pur-
chase the consumption good from d-retailers (c2,t) and to pay for the cost (in terms of deposit-
goods) related to lending activities (θbht ) (Table 6). It is noted that he cannot create infinite
amount of money for himself to buy consumption goods as there exists the capital requirement.
Even without the capital requirement, because deposits are bankers’ debts, the No-Ponzi condi-
tion is enough to prevent that from happening.
The banker faces two constraints in every period. At the end of each period, he has to hold
enough reserves as a fraction of total deposits, which is showed in the inequation (5).
The second constraint is the capital requirement constraint. The left hand side of (6) is the
4During one period, his reserves balance can go temporary negative. But in the end of every period, it must be
positive and satisfies the regulation. Hence, the constraint in purchasing cash-goods implicitly lies in the reserve
requirement
5It is assumed that households have to pay loans from the account at the bank they borrow. So if they want to
use money from account at bank B to pay for loans from bank A, they need to transfer deposits from bank B to
bank A first. In fact, this assumption does not matter in equilibrium.
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banker’s net worth (capital), which is equal to total assets minus total liabilities6. The constraint
requires the banker to hold capital greater than a fraction of total loans in his balance sheet. We
assume that κt is a constant κ in normal times. We later put the unexpected shock on this κt to
reflect the shock in a banking crisis.
Let γt , µrt and µct be respectively the Lagrangian multipliers attached to the reserves flows,
reserves constraint and the capital constraint. Let rht be defined as the real short-term lending
rate. The first order conditions of the banker’s problem can be written as:
γt =
(
αict
ci,t
)1/σ 1
ct
, i = 1,2 (7)
γt =
βR ft γt+1
pit+1
+µct (8)
γt =
βRmt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +ϕµ
r
t (9)
γt =
βRnt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +µ
r
t (10)
(qlt +θ)γt =
β [δb+(1−δb)qlt+1]γt+1
pit+1
+(1−κ)µct (11)
rht =
δb+(1−δb)qlt+1
(qlt +θ)pit+1
(12)
And two complimentary slackness conditions:
µrt ≥ 0, nt−ϕmt ≥ 0, µrt (nt−ϕmt) = 0 (13)
µct ≥ 0, nt +b ft +(1−κt)bht −mt ≥ 0, µct
(
nt +b
f
t +(1−κt)bht −mt
)
= 0 (14)
3.2 Households
There is a measure one of identical households. These self-employed households produce the
homogeneous intermediate good ymt to sell to the wholesale firms at the price P
m
t . In each period,
a household consumes the cash-goods (c˜1,t) from c-retailers and the deposit-goods (c˜2,t) from
6We use the book value Bht rather than the “market value” of loans q
l
tB
h
t in the capital constraint. The reason is
that illiquid bank loans should be treated differently from bonds. In reality, bank loans are often not revalued in the
balance sheet when the interest rate changes.
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d-retailers.
Let B˜ht be the nominal debt stock that she borrows from bankers. The loan structure follows
the description in Table (1). There is an exogenous borrowing constraint for households with
the debt limit b˜ht ≤ bh.
In each period, households choose {c˜t , lt ,at ,xt , b˜ht , m˜t , s˜t , c˜1,t , c˜2,t} to maximize their ex-
pected utility:
max
∞
∑
t=0
β˜ t
(
log(c˜t)−χlt
)
subject to
CIA: c˜1,t ≤ xt−1pit (15)
Loan Market: at +δb
b˜ht−1
pit
=
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qltst + τt (16)
DIA: c˜2,t ≤ at (17)
Budget: m˜t + xt + c˜1,t + c˜2,t = at +
xt−1
pit
+ pmt y
m
t +
Πt
Pt
(18)
Production: ymt = lt (19)
Loan flows: b˜ht = (1−δb)
b˜ht−1
pit
+ s˜t (20)
Constraint: b˜ht ≤ bh (21)
Consumption: c˜t =
[
2
∑
i=1
α
1
σ
i c˜
σ−1
σ
i,t
] σ
σ−1
(22)
When the cash-good market opens, the household brings (xt−1/pit) in cash to make trans-
actions there. She faces the cash-in-advance (15) constraint when purchasing goods from c-
retailers.
The loan market between bankers and households (16) only opens after that. Here the house-
hold pays a fraction of her old debts (δbbht−1/pit) and borrows new loan (q
l
tst). All of the trans-
actions are conducted electronically. We have assumed that she cannot readjust her portfolio
between cash and deposits in this step. In the end, she brings at amount of ZMDs to purchase
goods from d-retailers.
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The equation (18) is the household’s general budget constraint. After receiving the profits
(Πt/Pt) from wholesalers and revenue (pmt ymt ) from selling the intermediate good, she can go to
banks and readjust her portfolio between deposits (mt) and currency (xt).
Let η1,t , η2,t , ηbt be the Lagrangian for the cash-in-advance, the deposit-in-advance and the
borrowing constraint. Let λt be the Lagrangian for the budget constraint.
λt +ηi,t =
(
αic˜t
c˜i,t
)1/σ 1
c˜t
, i = 1,2 (23)
pmt λt = χ (24)
λt =
β˜ (λt+1+η1,t+1)
pit+1
(25)
λt =
β˜Rmt (λt+1+η2,t+1)
pit+1
(26)
qlt(λt +η2,t) =
β˜ [δb+(1−δb)qlt+1](λt+1+η2,t+1)
pit+1
+ηbt (27)
And three complimentary slackness conditions:
η1,t ≥ 0, xt−1pit − c˜1,t ≥ 0, η1,t
(
xt−1
pit
− c˜1,t
)
= 0 (28)
η2,t ≥ 0, at− c˜2,t ≥ 0, η2,t (at− c˜2,t) = 0 (29)
ηbt ≥ 0, bh−bht ≥ 0, ηbt
(
bh−bht
)
= 0 (30)
3.3 Retail Firms and Wholesale Firms
Following Rotemberg pricing, each wholesale firm j faces a cost of adjusting prices, which is
measured in terms of final good and given by:
ι
2
(
Pt( j)
Pt−1( j)
−pi
)2
yt
where ι determines the degree of nominal price rigidity and pi is the long-run inflation target.
The wholesale firm j discounts the profit in the future with rate β˜ iλt+i/λt . Her real marginal
cost is pmt .
15
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms will choose the same price and produce the same
quantity Pt( j) = Pt and yt( j) = yt = ymt . The optimal pricing rule then implies that:
1− ι (pit−pi)pit + ιβ˜
[
λt+1
λt
(pit+1−pi)pit+1 yt+1yt
]
= (1− pmt )ε (31)
3.4 The Central Bank and Government
The consolidated government uses the payoffs from tax or their assets to pay for the IOR, then
injects (withdraws) τˆt amount of money to (from) households to target the interbank rate. All
transactions are conducted in the electronic system.
τt =−
(Rnt−1−1)nt−1
pit
+ τˆt (32)
In the conventional monetary policy, we assume that the IOR Rnt is fixed at a constant level
Rn. The interbank rate follows a common Taylor rule. To connect with the common New
Keynesian literature, we assume that the central bank do not want to have excess reserves in
the banking system so they never set R ft lower than Rn+δ f where δ f > 07. Later, we relax the
assumption and examine the situation when the banking system is awash of excess reserves and
the central bank controls the interbank rate by adjusting Rnt .
The conventional monetary policy rule can be described as:
Rnt = Rn (33)
R ft = max
{
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+δ f
}
(34)
4 Equilibrium
Definition: A perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence of bankers’ decision choice {ct ,ci,t ,
nt ,bht ,st ,mt , b
f
t ,dt}, household’s choice {c˜t , c˜i,t , b˜ht , s˜t , m˜t ,xt , lt ,ymt }, the firms’ choice {yt}, the
7When the reserve requirement is no longer binding, there are infinite levels of reserves that can satisfy the
interbank rate at its lower bound. In this case, we need a rule governing the motion of reserves and change the
standard Taylor Rule.
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central bank’ choice {τt , Rnt }, and the market price {qlt ,R ft ,pit , pmt } such that:
i Given the market price, the initial conditions and the central bank’s choices, banker’s
choices solve the banker’s problem, household’s choices solve the household’s problem,
firm’s choice solves the firm’s problem.
ii All markets clear:
Net inflows of deposits: dt + et =−(xt− xt−1pit − c1,t) (35)
The interbank market: b ft = 0 (36)
Total ZMDs: mt = m˜t
Loan Market: bht = b˜
h
t
Good Market: yt =
2
∑
i=1
(ci,t + c˜i,t)+θbht +
ι
2
(pit−pi)2 yt (37)
Later, we set some different central bank’s monetary polices subject to a set of equations in this
perfect foresight equilibrium. In each case, we might also change the set of the central bank’s
monetary policy tools. For convenience, we define (AD) as the set of equations in the perfect
foresight equilibrium, excluding the monetary policy and exogenous shocks.
Definition: Let (AD) contain the set of equations and conditions in (C.1)-(C.23).
5 Theoretical Results
We make the following assumption to ensure that in the steady state, households borrow from
bankers.
Assumption 1. The discount factors of bankers and households satisfy:
βδb−θpi
pi−β (1−δb) >
β˜ δb
pi− β˜ (1−δb)
The next assumption ensures that in the steady state, inflation is equal to the central bank’s
inflation target.
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Assumption 2. The monetary policy tools satisfy:
lim
t→∞
τˆt
nt + xt
=
pi−1
pi
Rn+δ f <
pi
β
We start with the first result showing the relationship between the interest on reserves, the
deposit rate and the interbank rate.
Theorem 1. In equilibrium:
i The lower bound of the interbank rate and the deposit rate is the interest on reserves. In all
cases, Rnt ≤ Rmt ≤ R ft
ii When the constraint of reserve requirement is not binding, R ft = Rmt = R
n
t .
The benefits of holding reserves come from two sources. First, bankers earn the interest
on reserves. Second, bankers satisfy the reserve requirement, showing in the shadow price of
reserve constraint µrt ≥ 0. When the banking system has a huge amount of excess reserves,
second benefit is no longer there µrt = 0, and the interbank rate is equal to the interest on
reserves.
Theorem 2. In equilibrium, the level of the monetary base, as the sum of reserves and currency
in circulation, is decided solely by the central bank:
nt−1+ xt−1
pit
+ τˆt = nt + xt (38)
When households withdraw currency from their bank accounts, it only changes the level of
reserves but does not affect the level of monetary base. We assume that the central bank will
target the interbank rate, so it implies that the central bank will never leave the banking system
with the negative amount of reserves.
Theorem 3. Under the Assumption (1)-(2) and if κ satisfies:
κ < 1− (1−ϕ)m
bh
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where m is the steady state value of m, then there exists a unique steady state. Moreover, in this
steady state, the reserve requirement is binding while the capital constraint is not binding.
This unique steady state reflects well the banking system in the US before the Great Re-
cession. There were no excess reserves and the federal funds rate was around 4 percent. The
central bank’s main tool was open market operations at that time, rather than the IOR. After the
Great Recession, due to many rounds of quantitative easing (unconventional monetary policy),
the excess reserves skyrocketed. However, in the long term, the central bank has a plan to scale
down its balance sheet’s size to the level before the Great Recession, so this unique steady state
might reflect well the long-term position of the central bank.
6 Numerical Experiments
6.1 Calibration
The time period is one quarter. Data are calibrated to match the US economy before the Great
Recession. The bankers’ discount factor is set to the standard value 0.99. The reserves require-
ment is calibrated to reflect the ratio between the total level of reserves and the total ZMDs. In
Dec 2007, before the financial crisis, the total level of reserves was around 9 billion dollars. The
total MZM (Money Zero Maturity) was approximately 8130 billion, 75-80 percent of which are
checkable deposits, saving deposits and money market deposit accounts. The level of ZMDs
was therefore 6000 billion, and the ratio between reserves and ZMD is 0.0015, which we round
up to 0.002. The monitoring cost and the loan amortization factor are set exogenously. The
risk weight is calibrated so that it satisfies the condition in the Theorem 3 to ensure the unique
steady state. For κ ≥ 0.2, the capital constraint is binding in the steady state. Therefore, we set
κ at 0.18.
The consumption basket is calibrated to match the ratio between currency and ZMDs in the
economy. In Dec 2007, the total level of currency was 760 billion. Judson (2012) estimates that
more than half of US dollar bills are held overseas, so we end up with around 330 billion in
currency. At the same time, ZMDs was 6000 billion, so currency accounts for approximately 6
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Table 7: Parameter values
Param. Definition Value
Bankers
β Banker’s discount factor 0.99
ϕ The reserves requirement 0.002
κ The risk weight 0.18
θ The monitoring cost 0.0005
δb Loan amortization 0.5
Households
β˜ Household’s discount factor 0.985
χ Relative Utility Weight of Labor 0.586
bh The borrowing limit 1.5
Consumption Basket
α1 Share of cash goods in the basket 0.06
α2 Share of deposit goods 0.94
σ Elasticity of substitution between two goods 10
Firms
ε Elasticity of substitution of wholesale goods 4
ι Cost of changing price 80
Central bank
pi Inflation long-run target 1
φpi Policy responds to inflation 1.25
Rn The constant IOR 1+0.25/400
Rn+δ f The lower bound for FFR 1+0.251/400
percent of the total money supply (MZM). We calibrate α1 = 0.06 and α2 = 0.94 to match with
this fact. The elasticity of substitution between cash goods and deposit goods is set exogenously
10.
For the central bank’s parameters, the only unusual parameter is the interest on reserves.
We set it at 25 basis points and consider it as the lower bound for IOR at most cases in our
quantitative exercises. All other parameters are in the standard range in the New Keynesian
literature.
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6.2 Shock on the interbank rate
The first numerical experiment is to examine the response of the economy when the central bank
cuts the interbank rate. The list of equations for monetary policy and exogenous shock is:
R ft = max
{
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
exp(u ft ), Rn+δ f
}
Rnt = Rn
u ft = ρ f u
f
t−1, u
f
0 is given
(M1)
From the steady state, there is an unexpected shock on the interbank rate u f0 , then agents
know the shock will die slowly with the persistence ρ f . These two parameters’ values are in
Table 8. We can summarize this problem as (P1) containing the set of conditions in (AD) and
(M1). Figure 1 shows the response of the economy under this experiment.
When the central bank cuts the interbank rate by increasing the level of reserves, ql increases
and the real lending rate rh is lower for households. As bankers lend out by creating money
under the form of ZMDs, the money supply increases. It is noting that both currency and ZMD
go up after this shock. The aggregate demand is stimulated and inflation goes up.
Basically, this is identical to the reaction in the standard New Keynesian model. The only
key difference here is the role of commercial banks in creating money. Money supply is totally
endogenous and depends on the interaction between the central bank, banks and the public.
Another crucial point is that the effect of monetary policy, in this conventional setting, depends
on the transmission from the interbank rate to the lending rate in the loan contract between
bankers and households.
6.3 Financial Crisis - Taylor Rule
We examine a simple form of banking crisis by imposing an exogenous shock on κt , reflecting
the increase in the bad loans that causes the capital constraint to bind. The central bank is
21
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Figure 1: Impulse Response to Interest Rate Shock (P1)
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assumed to respond to this crisis using a Taylor Rule.
R ft = max
{
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+δ f
}
Rnt = Rn
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
(M2)
From the steady state, there is an unexpected shock κ0. After that, the shock dies with the per-
sistence ρκ . These two parameters’ values are reported in the Table 8. We can summarize this
problem as (P2) containing the set of conditions in (AD) and (M2).
As the lower bound on the interbank rate is the IOR, the Taylor rule is constrained by the
IOR. To see whether the negative IOR helps the central bank, we conduct another similar exper-
iment but allow the interest on reserves is negative during Te periods.
R ft = max
{
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+δ f
}
Rnt =

Rn, if t ≤ Te
Rn, if t > Te
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
(M3)
According to Bernanke (2016a), the Fed estimates that the interest rate paid on bank reserves
in the U.S. could not practically be brought lower than about -0.35 percent to avoid the bank
withdrawal. Hence, we set Rn = 1− 0.35/400 and Te = 50. We can set the problem (P3)
contains the equations in (AD) and (M3). Figure 2 shows the response of the economy under
these two experiments. Here are some important remarks:
i. A Taylor rule with a negative IOR is more efficient than the one with zero lower bound.
Rognlie (2015) gets the same result from a standard New Keynesian framework. However,
the positive effect is very small at dealing with this type of financial crisis.
ii. The banking crisis is dangerous as the the central bank cannot rely on the pass-through from
the interbank rate to the prime rate any more. In our simulation, the interbank rate is at its
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Figure 2: Financial Crisis - Taylor Rule (M2) and (M3)
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lower bound for 12 quarters with the IOR at 25 basis points and 4 quarters with the IOR at
-35 basis points ; however, the real lending rate still goes up. When the capital constraint is
binding µct > 0, the wedge between the interbank rate and the prime rate must reflect this
shadow price.
iii. The banking crisis is often accompanied by the deflation episode and the insufficient de-
mand. Bankers cut loan; therefore, the total money supply plummets even though the mon-
etary base increases. In our model, the level of currency goes up a little bit during the crisis.
The deposit rate is near zero or even negative in our two experiments, making currency
more favorable in households’ eyes. However, this change does not affect much the total
money supply because currency only accounts 6 percent of the total money supply in the
steady state.
iv. Lacking liquidity, households cut their own consumption and output declines. A Taylor
rule, even with a negative IOR, is not enough to stimulate the aggregate demand in this
case. When the link between the interbank rate and the prime rate breaks, the conventional
monetary policy is generally not effective.
6.4 Forward Guidance
The recent literature in monetary economics focuses on the forward guidance policy when in-
terest policy is restricted by the zero lower bound. In this section, we do a simple experiment to
see whether the forward guidance policy is useful in the banking crisis. There are two common
ways to model how the central bank informs the public about the interest rate path in the future:
(i) interest rate peg and (ii) news shock on the Taylor rule. We follow the latter in Keen, Richter
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and Throckmorton (2017b) to characterize the forward guidance as follows:
R ft = max
{
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
exp(εt), Rn+δ f
}
εt =

ε, if t ≤ TFG
0, if t > TFG
Rnt = Rn
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
(M4)
The central bank still follows the common Taylor rule. However, during the forward guidance
period 0≤ t ≤ TFG, the central bank commits to lower the intercept of the Taylor rule by exp(ε).
We set ε =−1/400. In the previous experiment, when following the Taylor rule, the interbank
rate is bounded by the IOR during the first 12 periods. Hence, we set the horizon for forward
guidance as 4 years (TFG = 16) to evaluate its efficacy in pushing up inflation.
The key channel that forward guidance affects the real economy is through increasing the
expected inflation. Hence, it lowers the real short-term interbank rate, which in turn passes
through to the real lending rate. In comparison to a common Taylor rule, forward guidance is
much more effective at pushing up the expected inflation. Like all monetary models with the
forward looking feature, path of inflation affects the current activities.
The effectiveness of forward guidance policy depends mostly on how far households look
forward in the future. In our model, if the horizon of forward guidance is around 5 years, this
policy cannot push up inflation. As banks cut loans due to the capital constraint, inflation should
be also consistent with the decline in the money supply path.
6.5 Financial Crisis - Mixed Rule
The previous section shows that a monetary policy targeting only the interbank rate is not ef-
ficient to deal with the banking crisis. What can the central bank do to improve the situation?
If the problem is a lack of liquidity in the private sector when banks cut loans, a natural guess
should be a policy of targeting the money supply directly. In this section, we examine a mod-
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Figure 3: Financial Crisis - Forward Guidance
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ification of a Taylor rule. In normal times, the central bank still targets the interbank rate by a
Taylor rule. However, in crises, when the interbank rate is pushed down to the level of IOR and
the deflation is still severe, the central bank will switch to target the growth of money supply
mst = mt + xt . All the exogenous shocks and monetary policy can be described by the following
system of equations:
R ft =
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi ( mst
mst−1
)φm
Rnt = Rn
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
(M5)
where φm = 0.2 measures the reaction of the interbank rate to the growth of the money supply.
The problem (P5) is defined to contain the equations in (AD) and (M5).
We set φm small relative to φpi for two reasons. First, it means that in normal times, the
interbank rate is not influenced much by the growth rate of the money supply. Second, it implies
that, in crises, when the interbank rate is not enough for raising inflation, the central bank will
respond aggressively by raising the money supply through helicopter money. Why? We can
rewrite the modified Taylor rule as:
mst
mst−1
=
(
R ft β
pi
)1/φm(
pi
pit+1
)φpi/φm
When the interbank rate is at its lower bound R ft = Rnt = Rn, it means that φpi/φm shows how
aggressively the central bank will raise the money supply to deal with inflation. Figure 4 shows
the economy’s response under this modified Taylor rule. Here are some important remarks:
i. In this banking crisis, when targeting the interbank rate is not efficient anymore, switching
to target the growth rate of the money supply is very effective. Both inflation and output
paths in this experiment are smoother and less volatile than a Taylor rule with a negative
IOR. A modified Taylor rule can anchor inflationary expectations better; thereby restricting
the increase in the real lending rate. This result is similar to Christiano and Rostagno (2001).
Their research also shows that when inflation is out of a bounded region, switching from
a Taylor rule to target the growth rate of the money supply can reduce the volatility of the
28
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Figure 4: Financial Crisis - Mixed Rule
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economy.
ii. The interest rate path alone does not reflect the stance of the monetary policy in a banking
crisis. If we only look at the paths of the interbank rate, a Taylor rule with a negative IOR
keeps the interbank rate not only longer at the lower bound but also lower in every period
in comparison to a mixed rule in this section (Figure 4a). If we follow the common New
Keynesian logic, inflation should have been higher in the previous experiment. However,
this is not the case here. When we model explicitly the microfoundation in the banking
sector, the link between the money supply and the interest rate is not as tight as the one in
the New Keynesian literature. Money supply is not determined solely by the central bank.
Moreover, the central bank do not control the interest rate by directly changing the money
supply here.
iii. inflationary expectation is anchored by both the money supply and the interest rate. Seemly,
money supply is a more credible signal for the inflation path in banking crises.
6.6 Taylor Rule and Friedman’s k-percent Rule
The new tool IOR allows the central bank to target both the interest rate and money supply at the
same time. In this section, the central bank is assumed to follow the Friedman’s k-percent rule
during our crisis. The Friedman’s k-percent rule indicates that the growth of the money supply
is fixed at a constant level:
Mt
Mt−1
= pi
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At the same time, IOR is adjusted following a Taylor rule. The set of monetary policies and the
exogenous shock can be written as:

mt
mt−1
=
pi
pit
, if t ≤ Te
R ft = max
[
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+δ f
]
, if t > Te
Rnt =

(1−αn)Rn+αnpiβ
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, if t ≤ Te
Rn, if t > Te
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
(M6)
where αn = 0.8 and Te = 50. Together with the equations in (AD), (M6) sets up the problem
(P6). This experiment can be summarized as followings. Before time Te, the central bank targets
both the IOR and the money supply by, respectively, a Taylor rule and the Friedman’s k-percent
rule. After time Te, the central bank comes back to its Taylor rule and only targets the interbank
rate. Figure 5 compares the effect of monetary polices in (P6) with the previous experiment.
Here are some important remarks:
i. Targeting both the money supply and the interest rate is extremely efficient. The inflation
rate is nearly anchored at the target level for the whole time. As our model does not have
any real rigidities, it implies the output is also at the steady state level.
ii. The obvious byproduct of targeting the growth of money supply directly is clearly the sharp
increase of reserves and excess reserves. Reserves increase by 25 times in our model and
the reserves requirement is no longer binding for 25 periods. Many economists worry that
a huge amount of excess reserves might prevent the effectiveness of the monetary policy
or create hyperinflation. Our model shows these concerns have no foundations. By using
the IOR, the central bank can control the interbank rate. The effect is very similar to the
one when the central bank adjusts by using open market operations. There are also no
reasons to believe the huge amount of reserves will create a huge amount of money supply.
When the reserves requirement is no longer binding, we cannot use the logic in the money
31
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
 
 
R f - M ix ed Ru le
R f - Tay lor+negativ e IOR
R f - Fridman+Tay lor
R n - M ix ed Ru le
R n - Tay lor+negative IOR
R n - Fridman+Tay lor
(a) Interbank rate and IOR
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
 
 
r
h - M ix ed Ru le
r
h - Tay lor+negativ e IOR
r
h - Fridman+Tay lor
(b) Real lending rate
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
 
 
n - M ix ed Ru le
n - Tay lor+negativ e IOR
n - Fridman+Tay lor
(c) Reserves
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
 
 
MS - M ix ed Ru le
MS - Tay lor+negativ e IOR
MS - Fridman+Tay lor
(d) Money Supply
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
 
 
pi - M ix ed Ru le
pi - Tay lor+negativ e IOR
pi - Fridman+Tay lor
(e) Inflation
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
−1.8
−1.6
−1.4
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
 
 
y - M ix ed Ru le
y - Tay lor+negativ e IOR
y - Fridman+Tay lor
(f) Output
Figure 5: Financial Crisis - a Taylor Rule and the Friedman’s k-percent Rule
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multiplier model to create the link between the monetary base and money supply anymore.
Until there is still a borrowing constraint and capital requirement, the endogenous money
supply is always bounded. Furthermore, the inflation, in the long run, is always determined
by the central bank.
iii. Once again, we emphasize that the stance of monetary policy can only be judged when we
observe both the nominal interbank rate, the money supply and the real short-term rate. The
money supply and the interest rate can move in any directions. It can be the case that the
central bank increases the money supply and the IOR at the same time. It might be a serious
mistake to infer that it would cause a deflation.
iv. The above point raises an important issue about the central bank’s communication. In
reality, the stance of the monetary policy, when sending to the public, is often summarized
by only one indicator: the interbank rate. Indeed, this is a common and good practice as
the interbank rate is a unique short-term target that the central bank controls completely. In
normal times, it is a good predicator of inflation path. However, the current situation is very
tricky. The interbank rate in most developed countries has been near zero for a long time
and the inflation is persistently lower than its target. The growth rate of the money supply
should be included as part of the central bank’s communication with the public.
7 Conclusion
With a huge amount of excess reserves in the banking systems, IOR is now the most crucial tool
for the Fed. This tool opens a new opportunity for the conduct of monetary policy as the central
bank can target both the interest rate and the growth rate of the money supply at the same time.
Of course, in normal times, adjusting the interbank rate alone is always timely and much more
transparent than targeting the money supply, which is not entirely controlled by the central bank.
However, in banking crises, our research shows that the link between the interbank rate and the
lending rate is very weak. If the central bank simultaneously targets both the interbank rate and
the money supply, they can hit the inflation target.
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A Parameter values in experiments
Table 8
Param. Definition Value
Experiment (M1)
u f0 Initial interest shock -2/400
ρ f The persistence of the interest shock 0.7
Experiment (M2)
κ0 Initial shock on the risk weight 0.224
ρκ The persistence of shock 0.95
Experiment (M3)
Rn The negative lower bound for IOR 1-0.35/400
Te Number of periods Rnt = R
n 50
Experiment (M4)
ε The forward guidance signal -1/400
TFG Number of periods in forward guidance 16
Experiment (M5)
φm Coefficient in mixed rule 0.2
Experiment (M6)
αn Coefficient in Taylor Rule 0.8
Te Number of periods targeting both MS and IR 50
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B Mathematical Appendix
Proof for Theorem 1:
We rewrite the equation (8), (9) and (10):
γt =
βR ft γt+1
pit+1
+µct (B.1)
γt =
βRmt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +ϕµ
r
t (B.2)
γt =
βRnt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +µ
r
t (B.3)
As µct and µrt are non-negative and γt > 0, we have Rnt ≤ Rmt ≤ R ft .
The ′′ =′′ happens when µrt = 0, or when the reserver requirement is no longer binding.
Proof for Theorem 2:
Substitute (32), (36) and (35) into the reserve flows equation (1), we have:
nt−1+ xt−1
pit
+ τˆt = nt + xt
Proof for Theorem 3:
We omit the subscript “t” to denote the steady state value of a variable. Under the Assumption
(2) and the result of the Theorem (2)⇒ pi = pi . Under the Assumption (2) and the Taylor rule
(34)⇒ R f = pi/β . Replace this value of R f into (8)⇒ µc = 0 (the capital requirement is not
binding). From (10) and (9)⇒ Rm; from (11)⇒ ql .
µr
γ
= 1− βR
n
pi
Rm =
(
1−ϕ µ
r
γ
)
pi
β
ql =
βδb−θpi
pi−β (1−δb)
τˆ =
pi−1
pi
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Under the steady state, (31)⇒ pm = (ε−1)/ε . Next we move on the household’s equation
and can find the steady state of:
(24)⇒ λ = χ
pm
(25)⇒ η1 =
(
λ − β˜λ
pi
)
pi
β˜
(26)⇒ η2 =
(
λ − β˜R
mλ
pi
)
pi
β˜Rm
(27)⇒ ηb = ql(λ +η2)− β˜ [δb+(1−δb)q
l](λ +η2)
pi
> 0
(21)⇒ bh = bh
(3)⇒ s =
(
1− 1−δb
pi
)
bh
From (23), we can perform c˜i as a function of c˜:
c˜i =
αi(c˜)1−σ
(λ +ηi)σ
(B.4)
Substituting (B.4) into the aggregate consumptions (22), we can find the steady state value of c˜,
then c˜1 and c˜2:
c˜ =
(
2
∑
i=1
αi
(λ +ηi)σ−1
) 1
σ−1
All the constraints (15), (17) are binding:
x = pi c˜1
a = c˜2
From (5), (32) and (16), we can find m and n from the following equations:[
Rm− (Rn−1)ϕ]m
pi
= a+
δbbh
pi
− τˆ−qls
n = ϕm
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Replacing that into the deposit flows:
2
∑
i=1
ci = m−
(
Rmm
pi
+qls+θbh− δbb
h
pi
− x+ x
pi
− (R
n−1)n
pi
+ τ
)
(B.5)
From(7), (4) and use (B.5):
ci =
αic1−σ
γσ
c1−σ
γσ
(α1+α2) = c1+ c2
ci =
αi(c1+ c2)
α1+α2
c =
[
2
∑
i=1
α1/σi c
σ−1
σ
i
] σ
σ−1
We know that this steady state only exists if κ satisfy the condition such that capital constraint
is not binding, so we need the condition:
κ < 1− (1−ϕ)m
bh
C System of Equations in Equilibrium
Bankers:
γt =
(
αict
ci,t
)1/σ 1
ct
, i = 1,2 (C.1)
γt =
βR ft γt+1
pit+1
+µct (C.2)
γt =
βRmt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +ϕµ
r
t (C.3)
γt =
βRnt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +µ
r
t (C.4)
(qlt +θ)γt =
β [δb+(1−δb)qlt+1]γt+1
pit+1
+(1−κ)µct (C.5)
nt−1
pit
+
xt−1
pit
+ τˆt = nt + xt (C.6)
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mt =
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qLt st +θb
h
t −δb
bht−1
pit
+ c2,t + c1,t− xt + xt−1pit −
(Rnt−1−1)nt−1
pit
+ τˆt (C.7)
0≤ µrt ⊥ (nt−ϕmt)≥ 0 (C.8)
0≤ µct ⊥
(
nt +(1−κt)bht −mt
)
≥ 0 (C.9)
bht = (1−δb)
bht−1
pi
+ st (C.10)
Households:
λt +ηi,t =
(
αic˜t
c˜i,t
)1/σ 1
c˜t
, i = 1,2 (C.11)
pmt λt = χ (C.12)
λt =
β˜ (λt+1+η1,t+1)
pit+1
(C.13)
λt =
β˜Rmt (λt+1+η2,t+1)
pit+1
(C.14)
qlt(λt +η2,t) =
β˜ [δb+(1−δb)qlt+1](λt+1+η2,t+1)
pit+1
+ηbt (C.15)
0≤ η1,t ⊥
(
xt−1
pit
− c˜1,t
)
≥ 0 (C.16)
0≤ η2,t ⊥
(
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qltst + τˆt−
(Rnt−1−1)nt−1
pit
−δb
bht−1
pit
− c˜2,t
)
≥ 0 (C.17)
0≤ ηbt ⊥
(
bh−bht
)
≥ 0 (C.18)
Firms:
1− ι (pit−pi)pit + ιβ˜ λt+1λt (pit+1−pi)pit+1
yt+1
yt
= (1− pmt )ε (C.19)
yt = lt (C.20)
Market Clearing:
yt =
2
∑
i=1
(ci,t + c˜i,t)+θbht +
ι
2
(pit−pi)2 yt (C.21)
ct =
[
2
∑
i=1
α
1
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
i,t
] σ
σ−1
(C.22)
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c˜t =
[
2
∑
i=1
α
1
σ
i c˜
σ−1
σ
i,t
] σ
σ−1
(C.23)
Central bank:
R ft = max
{
R f
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+δ f
}
(C.24)
Rnt = Rn (C.25)
D Numerical Method
D.1 Inequality Constraints
There are 6 occasionally binding inequality constraints in our model: the reserve requirement,
the capital requirement, the deposit-in-advance, the cash-in-advance, the household’s borrowing
constraint and the Taylor rule of the central bank. We deal with these occasionally binding
constraints by three methods:
Method 1: We apply the method in Zangwill and Garcia (1981) and Schmedders, Judd and
Kubler (2002) to transform the complementary conditions into the equality constraints. For
example, if we have the following complementary condition:
µt f (xt) = 0, µt ≥ 0, f (xt)≥ 0
We create a new variable µ
t
and transforms the above conditions into two following equations:
µt = max{µ t ,0}
3
f (xt) = max{−µ t ,0}
3
We apply this method for the reserves requirement, deposit-in-advance and cash-in-advance
constraints.
Method 2: For the capital requirement and the household’s borrowing constraint, we apply
the penalty method in McGrattan (1996) to avoid the ill-conditioned of the system and deal
with occasionally binding constraints. So the utility of banker and the capital constraint will be
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changed as:
U = logct− ρe4 max{µ
c
t
,0}4
nt +b
f
t +(1−κt)bht −mt =−µct
where ρe = 1e6 is the penalty coefficient. When the capital constraint is violated, banker will
lose the utility. However, when they get positive net worth, they do not get reward for that. The
household’s utility also is changed to deal with the borrowing constraint.
Method 3: For the Taylor rule of the central bank, we use the soft max constraint to deal with the
lower bound on R fmin = Rn+δ f so we can still take derivative to solve the system of equations:
ut = R f
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
R ft =
ut +
log(1+exp(smax(R
f
min−ut)))
smax
, if ut ≥ R fmin
R fmin+
log(1+exp(smax(ut−R fmin)))
smax
, if ut < R
f
min
When smax→ ∞, the soft max constraint converges to the hard max constraint. We choose the
coefficient smax = 1e4.
D.2 Dynamics of Economy
We solve the perfect foresight equilibrium with the unexpected shock by assuming that after
T = 300 quarters, the economy will converge back to the initial steady state. The initial position
before the unexpected shocks is the steady state. Basically, we need to solve a large system
of equations to determine the dynamic path of the economy. The transform of occasionally
inequality constraints in the previous section ensures that every equation is continuous and dif-
ferentiable.
For every application, we use homotopy method for solving this large system of equation,
with the initial point starting from the steady state or the previous result. We use Ipopt written
by Wachter and Biegler (2006) with the linear solver HSL8 to conduct homotopy.
In all cases, we can solve successfully the perfect foresight path with the accuracy at least
8HSL. A collection of Fortran codes for large scale scientific computation. http://www.hsl.rl.ac.uk/
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1e−9. In some results, only at the last period T −1, we observe that there is a big switch from
deposits to currency while the total money supply does not change much. When we increase the
length of periods from T = 300 to T = 1000 the path does not change. We omit the result in the
last period to ensure the smoothness of the result.
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